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 Abstract 
 
English 
This research provides an initial insight in the effect of Europeanization on city behaviour within 
polynuclear urban regions through a case study of the Dutch polynuclear urban region of the Randstad. 
Using the framework of ‘upload’ and ‘download’ Europeanization devised by Marshall (2005), it is 
hypothesised that both forms of  Europeanization stimulate cooperation and competition. The results 
suggest that Europeanization does not specifically increase either cooperation or competition, but has a 
stimulating effect on both depending on the specific circumstances. It is also concluded that a high 
level of social capital exists in the Randstad, making it easy to establish cooperative action within the 
region. A comparative analysis between multiple polynuclear urban regions is suggested in order to 
uncover whether this is unique to the Randstad. Regardless of the good practice of cooperation within 
the region, its functional interconnectedness appears to be smaller than expected. No supporting 
evidence is found to suggest that the process of Europeanization has stimulated the Randstad to 
integrate towards one urban mega region. In order to fully uncover behavioural patterns, the current 
research should be extended, incorporating interconnectedness issues in the Randstad.  
 
Nederlands 
Dit onderzoek geeft een eerste inzicht in het effect van het proces van Europeanisering op het gedrag 
van steden in polynucleaire stedelijke regio’s door middel van een casestudy van de Randstad. Met 
gebruik van de door Marshall (2005) ontwikkelde theorie van ‘upload’ en ‘download’ Europeanisering, 
worden de hypotheses gevormd dat deze beide vormen van Europeanisering leiden tot zowel 
samenwerking als competitie. Op basis van de resultaten wordt verwacht dat Europeanisering niet 
specifiek samenwerking dan wel competitie stimuleert, maar een effect heeft op allebei afhankelijk 
van de specifieke situatie. Hiernaast wordt geconcludeerd dat er een hoog niveau van sociaal kapitaal 
bestaat in de Randstad, wat ervoor zorgt dat samenwerking makkelijk tot stand komt binnen de regio. 
Om te onderzoeken of dat uniek is voor de Randstad, wordt een vergelijkend onderzoek tussen 
meerdere polynucleaire regio’s voorgesteld. Ondanks de heersende cultuur van goede samenwerking 
in de Randstad, lijkt de functionele interconnectedness in de regio kleiner te zijn dan verwacht. Er 
wordt geen bewijs gevonden dat Europeanisering de Randstad stimuleert tot integratie in de richting 
van een stedelijke mega-regio. Om de gedragspatronen volledig bloot te leggen, moet het huidige 
onderzoek uitgebreid worden waarbij de problemen met interconnectedness in de Randstad worden 
meegenomen. 
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I. Introduction 
Within the European Union, actors have come to realise that they depend largely on urban regions. 
After all, the policy created within European institutions has to be implemented by regions and cities 
and has a direct impact on them. Recently, European ministers emphasized the importance of urban 
regions when they signed the Pact of Amsterdam in which it is stated that urban regions play a key 
role in successfully achieving the European Union’s objectives (EU Ministers Responsible for Urban 
Matters, 2016). Because of the focus on regions, the Europeanization process has provided lots of 
opportunities and incentives for cities and other sub-state entities to get involved in the European 
Union and shape an international agenda (Kübler & Piliutyte, 2007, p.366).   
In 2003, the four largest cities of the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) 
seized this opportunity and started working together in a European “G-4” representation office in 
Brussels. There, they aim to monitor EU policy developments and push their interests on the agenda 
(G-4 Europe, 2014). On the other hand, according to Hoetjes (2009, p.160), the four cities have also 
been eagerly pursuing an individual international image based on their specific historical and cultural 
identity, making the cooperation in Brussels seem troublesome from the start. 
The G-4 cities are the largest four cities of the Dutch polynuclear urban region of the Randstad. Other 
polynuclear urban regions include the Flemish Diamond consisting of i.a. Antwerp, Brussels and 
Ghent and the Rhein-Ruhr area where Dortmund, Düsseldorf and Cologne are the largest cities 
(Ipenburg & Lambregts, 2001). Polynuclear regions differ from other urban regions because they have 
more than one centre: multiple similar cities are in proximity. In other urban regions, there is a large 
centre-city surrounded by a zone of smaller, suburban municipalities (Dijkstra & Poelman, 2012). 
What all these urban regions have in common is the interconnectedness of cities and municipalities. 
However, being (economically) interwoven does not necessarily mean that the region is also 
politically cooperative. Even in one-centred urban areas there is often political fragmentation (Van der 
Heiden, 2010, p.28). To achieve efficient political cooperation within polynuclear regions might be 
even more complicated due to the lack of a core city holding supposed natural leadership. 
The Dutch example illustrates that the effect of the European integration process on regional city 
behaviour remains uncertain. On the one hand the process stimulated cooperation in Brussels; on the 
other hand, incentives for cities to pursue an individual international image appear to exist. The effects 
of European integration are especially uncertain in polynuclear urban regions where there is no natural 
hierarchy in political cooperation. The lack of systematic evidence on what city behaviour can be 
expected raises the question: “Does European integration stimulate competition or does it stimulate 
cooperation between cities within polynuclear urban regions?”  
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Relevance 
The scientific relevance of this research question lies in the relatively new approach concerning urban 
regions. Kübler and Pagano (2012) state that in the globalised world where city regions are growing 
and play an international role, the urban regions are a better unit of analysis than the individual cities. 
Especially on the domestic and regional behaviour of cities that pursue an active international role, not 
much research has been conducted. When it comes to urban participation in international relations and 
the domestic consequences of this participation, a systematic lack of information is observed (Kübler 
& Pagano, 2012, p.127). 
There is debate on how government in urban regions should be understood and managed. On the one 
hand there are proponents of institutional consolidation who argue that competition between cities 
within a region has negative effects (Kübler & Pagano, 2012, p.120). On the other side are those who 
do not oppose governmental fragmentation. They expect it to result in more innovation, efficiency and 
flexibility (Kübler & Pagano, 2012, pp.120-121). Within a third school of ‘New Regionalism’ it is 
argued that coordinated behaviour comes from voluntary cooperation in policy networks (Kübler & 
Pagano, 2012, p.122). However, not much is known about the circumstances under which this 
voluntary cooperation occurs (Hawkins, 2010, pp.268-269): if fragmentation exists, local governments 
will individually offer competitive incentives because it is not certain that another government will not 
do the same (Hawkins, 2010, p.254). It is therefore relevant to find out how cooperative regional 
behaviour is shaped in an integrated Europe, because it can start to unveil how cooperative behaviour 
can or should be improved. 
Not only is there scientific relevance, it is also in the general interest of society and government to 
gain knowledge about the domestic effects of international urban activity. The illustrated debate is 
important for the entire society, because it is ultimately about necessary institutional reforms in order 
to keep up with the globalised world in which cities play an international role. In the Netherlands, for 
example, it is often argued that the current administrative division within the Randstad is not in the 
region’s best interest. The region is indeed heavily politically fragmented: it consists of over 150 
municipalities divided over four provinces (Lambregts, Janssen-Jansen & Haran, 2008). It has been 
suggested that urban regions can experience an advantage in inter-regional competition if they 
cooperate intra-regionally (Van der Heiden, 2010, p.28). Researching the behavioural patterns of cities 
and municipalities, can reveal what institutional changes could enhance cooperation that is beneficial 
for the region’s development. 
This research will make an effort to start unveiling cities’ behavioural patterns in response to the 
European integration process. First, a theoretical background will be provided. After that, the research 
design is described and the results of the research are presented. Finally conclusions will be drawn and 
discussed. 
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II. Theoretical background 
This section will start with a theoretical background to polynuclear urban regions. Then, mechanisms 
through which Europeanization affects sub-national governments will be discussed. Finally, some 
remarks are provided as to why behaviour within the urban region is expected to be more important 
than interactions between cities not originating from the same urban region.  
Polynuclear urban regions 
Ipenburg and Lambregts (2001, p.3) define a polynuclear urban region as “a region composed of a 
collection of historically and administratively distinct smaller and larger cities located in more or less 
close proximity (roughly within commuting distance), the larger of which do not differ significantly in 
terms of size or overall economic and political importance”. They state that polynuclear urban regions 
originate from the prevailing administrative structure in sixteenth century Europe (Ipenburg & 
Lambregts, 2001). The definition given by Burger, Van der Knaap and Wall (2014) is in line with this 
historical approach. According to them, a polynuclear urban region is composed of “a set of 
historically and spatially separate metropolitan areas comprising a larger, functionally interrelated 
urban region” (Burger et al., 2014, p.817).  
Historically, settlements were dispersed within a relatively small territory and the various cities were 
later surrounded by their own urban region. These smaller urban regions merged into a polynuclear 
urban region through developments in i.e. rail- and highways. Interconnectedness was reached due to 
the relative proximity of the original settlements (Ipenburg & Lambregts, 2001, p.3). The fact that 
urban centres grew together and formed a larger urban region, makes it clear that polynuclear urban 
regions typically consist of cities smaller in size than the cities at the core of a one-centred urban 
region. There was a constraint on the growth of cities in polynuclear urban regions, because they were 
located close to each other. 
Even though the existence of polynuclear urban regions is acknowledged, the emphasis in research is 
often still on the most common urban regions surrounding one core city. In these prevalent regions, the 
network between the many players is already complicated, but in polynuclear urban regions the 
relations in the urban region lie even more complex (Burger et al., 2014). Cities at the centre of urban 
regions are responsible for connecting the region to the global economy and international politics (Van 
der Heiden, 2010). In polynuclear urban regions, such hierarchy is lacking (Turok & Bailey, 2002). 
This institutional fragmentation can hinder the establishment of cooperative action (Hawkins, 2010, 
p.254). Another reason why cooperative action could be hard to establish, it that every city might seek 
to become the region’s principal city, and benefit from the individual international furore.  
On the other hand, a single city originating from a polynuclear urban region might realise that it 
cannot speak for the entirety of its polynuclear urban region while a city at the core of an urban region 
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can. Because the polynuclearity has restrained the growth of individual cities in polynuclear urban 
regions, cities from these regions may come to realise that individually they are too small to achieve a 
competitive position in the world economy and that they should not compete inter-regionally. 
 ‘Upload’ and ‘download’ Europeanization 
Not only theory of polynuclearity provides assumptions about cooperative and competitive behaviour 
of cities. Theory about the influence of European integration also helps to form expectations. To 
analyse urban Europeanization, Marshall (2005) devised a useful framework in which he distinguishes 
‘upload’ and ‘download’ Europeanization. He defines ‘download Europeanization’ as: “changes in 
policies, practices, preferences or participants within local systems of governance, arising from the 
negotiation and implementation of EU programmes” (Marshall, 2005, p.672). ‘Upload 
Europeanization’ is defined as: “the transfer of innovative urban practices to the supranational arena, 
resulting in the incorporation of local initiatives in pan-European policies or programmes” (Marshall, 
2005, p.672).  
Kübler and Piliutyte (2007) describe aspects of both these types of Europeanization. The authors 
approach upload Europeanization as interest representation at the European level (Kübler & Piliutyte, 
2007, pp.368-369). Interest representation can be a motivator for cities to cooperate, as the earlier 
described G-4 office shows. Apart from the establishment of an EU office, upload Europeanization 
happens through transnational city networks such as Eurocities (Kübler & Piliutyte, 2007, p.369). 
Cooperatively representing interests at a European level is especially important for cities within 
polynuclear urban regions, because of their relatively small size. When cities are cooperating, they are 
at a more equal level to larger cities within the European Union. Based on this theory, the first 
hypothesis for this research can be formulated: 
H1 Upload Europeanization stimulates regional cooperation because together cities are a larger weight 
in the European scale. 
Interest representation often happens through transnational city networks. These networks represent 
voluntary urban cooperation, but it is important to note that they do not necessarily stimulate genuine 
cooperation. The specific organisation of the networks in working groups and thematic committees 
provides an opportunity for representatives of relatively smaller sized cities to obtain a level of 
relevance that is “superior to the ‘share’ of their city in the international urban hierarchy” (Kübler & 
Piliutyte, 2007, p.370). This notion is again especially interesting regarding polynuclear urban regions, 
because of the smaller sized cities in them. The possibility to increase influence through city networks 
could function as a catalyst for competition within polynuclear urban regions. The cities can be 
expected to compete to increase their own visibility at the cost of other cities’ influential gain. 
According to Van der Heiden (2010) international visibility and publicity is indeed an asset for cities 
in their international activities and thus it can be a motive for competition.  
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To obtain visibility, a city’s specific cultural and historical identity is an important tool (Kübler & 
Piliutyte, 2007, p.362). In polynuclear urban regions, every city possesses its own historical and 
cultural heritage on which each city can try to base an international name independently. The G-4 city 
of The Hague is an example of this. The city has historically been known as an “international city of 
peace and justice” and has been actively positioning itself as a relevant international hub that is 
attractive for international organizations and all the economic advantages they bring along (Gemeente 
Den Haag, 2014). The perks are considerable: 37,500 jobs owe their existence to the international 
activity of The Hague, more than ten per cent of the total employment of the city (Decisio, 2014). 
Visibility not only has its economic benefits, mayors may also have personal incentives. It is known 
that mayors sometimes use international policy to gain political power, leadership and respect (Kübler 
& Pagano, 2012, p.126). The prestige associated with internationality and European influence might 
drive mayors (or aldermen) to pursue an individual international image, resulting in competition 
among cities and their officials. In summary, through transnational city networks, cities can increase 
their relevance. They do this to gain an international profile which has its economic benefits, but can 
also be used by mayors or aldermen to increase individual political power. The second hypothesis is 
based on this theory: 
H2 Upload Europeanization stimulates competition because cities from polynuclear urban regions seize 
the Europeanization process as an opportunity to increase their individual international relevance. 
Transnational city networks – which are shown to be fundamental to upload Europeanization – can 
also be seen as tools of download Europeanization. The networks can function to exchange knowledge, 
know-how and innovation to improve cities’ urban policymaking (Kübler & Piliutyte, 2007, p.367). 
This exchange of information is not the only aspect of download Europeanization. The adoption of 
European legislation is also an important aspect. Keeping up with ever changing, complicated 
European legislation can be difficult for individual cities and can motivate cooperation (Kübler & 
Piliutyte, 2007, p.367). Cities can exchange information on regional policy that applies to them all 
while sharing the costs of acquiring this information. This results in the third hypothesis: 
H3 Download Europeanization stimulates cooperation because the European policy process is complex 
and cities cooperate to keep track of the changing policy that will impact them all. 
Not only do cities voluntarily choose to cooperate, the European Union itself also actively promotes 
regional integration. To achieve goals of regional integration and development, the EU funds cities 
and municipalities through numerous programmes (European Commission, Funding for cities). The 
obtainment of European funding can be seen as an aspect of download Europeanization. De Rooij 
(2002) identified EU funds as one of the most important motivators for cities to actively get involved 
in the European Union. 
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EU funding can have specific requirements of regional coordination and cooperation, and has in cases 
decreased distrust and rivalry between neighbouring cities (Marshall, 2005, p.677). However, a lot of 
regional goals have not yet been achieved. The administrative complexities of European programmes 
and the top-down approach to achieve integration are often mentioned to explain this (Scott, 1999; 
McCarthy, 2003). According to Scott (1999, p.610), funding meant for regional cooperation and 
development purposes is at times seen as nothing more than an additional basis of income for cities, 
and not always actually used to work towards the regional goals of the European Union.  
EU funding for cross-border cooperation has even been pointed out as a reason that competition 
amongst cities within the same region grows fiercer because neighbouring authorities compete heavily 
to obtain the same EU funds even when it is meant for regional integration (Church & Reid, 1996, 
p.1309). This implies funding can have counterproductive effects. De Rooij (2002, p.455) describes 
how European funding meant for sub-national authorities is often first transferred to the national 
government for redistribution. This forces the sub-national authorities to compete not only on a 
European level but also within the national arena. It appears that the availability of European funding 
triggers competition more than it promotes regional cooperative goals. This incites a final hypothesis: 
H4 Download Europeanization stimulates competition because cities within the same polynuclear urban 
region will compete to obtain European funding. 
The relevance of cooperation within the region and the inter-regional situation 
The analysis of aspects of ‘download’ and ‘upload’ Europeanization has uncovered potential ways in 
which the European integration process can stimulate both cooperation and competition among cities. 
The mechanisms leading to either competition or cooperation do not necessarily apply solely to cities 
in close proximity: the European integration process also affects the behaviour among cities from 
different countries and urban regions. The hypotheses and research question in this research, however 
concern regional behaviour only. This is because cooperation largely stems from economic incentives 
which mainly apply to the direct urban region. This, together with the earlier mentioned fact that the 
European Commission actively stimulates regional cooperation whereas competition can be fiercest 
within the urban region, makes the analysis of behaviour within the region particularly relevant. 
Saxenian (1996) states that regional cooperation offers a competitive advantage, paradoxically 
especially so in the globalized world. According to the author, “geographic proximity promotes the 
repeated interaction and mutual trust needed to sustain collaboration and to speed the continual 
recombination of technology and skill” (Saxenian, 1996, p.161). Even though regional cooperation 
seems favourable to increase competitiveness, cities do not always find that it is in their individual 
interest to leave international economic activity to another entity. Van der Heiden (2010, p.28) calls 
this a “double logic of competition”. The author states that intra-regional cooperation is considered to 
be beneficial for the region in general whereas internal competition can restrict the region’s effective 
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entrance in global competition (Van der Heiden, 2010, pp.28-29). Meanwhile, it is in the interest of 
individual municipalities to attract capital towards their own territory, leading to fierce competition. 
That individual competitive incentives to attract investors are indeed offered is broadly accepted (i.a. 
Hawkins, 2010; McCarthy, 2003). According to Goetz and Kayser (1993, p.63), the fiercest 
competition for private investment is often even between neighbouring cities.  
Apart from this competition, cooperative willingness is detectable as well. City officials apparently are 
aware of the spill-over effect of economic development for the entire region (Goetz & Kayser, 1993, 
p.76). Many officials accept that competition can be wasteful and should sometimes be restricted to 
avoid disadvantages in inter-regional competition (McCarthy, 2003, p.140). According to Hawkins 
(2010), cooperative action occurs when transaction costs associated with this cooperation are low. 
This means that cooperation is facilitated by contextual endogenous resources such as social capital 
and mutual trust as these resources lower transaction costs (Hawkins, 2010).  
The importance of contextual endogenous resources implies that the local situation in an urban region 
is an important aspect of cooperative regional behaviour. For instance, the fact that a city council’s 
legitimacy is based on the electorate in the own city, not on the urban region could lead to 
opportunistic competition over development between cities from the same urban region. Huggins 
(2017) also stresses that there are more and more opportunities for cities to engage in the European 
Union in a bottom-up manner, which signifies that the local situation is increasingly important for the 
Europeanization process. Local willingness is essential to regional cooperation, if local authorities do 
not consider cooperation worthwhile, it will not happen.  
III. Research design 
In the previous section, four hypotheses have been formulated based on theory of polynuclear urban 
regions and the impact of Europeanization on them. Furthermore, it has been argued why the 
cooperative or competitive behaviour of cities within their own urban regions (as opposed to the 
behaviour of cities toward other European cities) is the most relevant level of analysis for this research. 
In this third section, the research design will be described, as well as the operationalization of the key 
concepts ‘cooperation’ and ‘competition’. The research is a case study of the polynuclear urban region 
of the Randstad in the Netherlands. Background information on the Randstad and the reasons for 
selecting this case will first be provided. 
Case selection 
The research question of this research concerns polynuclear urban regions. These regions are 
especially interesting, because the complex political networks in them – consisting of many players, 
none of which is dominant – can provide an exclusive insight in the functioning of urban cooperation 
or competition in all its complexity. The above described Randstad region in the Netherlands can 
 | 8 | 
 
function as an exemplifying (or: typical) case of polynuclearity. An exemplifying case study allows 
for an examination of key social processes and can uncover mechanisms on which not much theory 
has been formed (Bryman, 2012, p.70).  
The Randstad is a valid typical case, because it meets the conditions of a polynuclear urban region 
mentioned in the two definitions provided above. The region has been called a classic example of a 
polynuclear urban region stemming from the historically prevailing administrative practice in Europe 
(Ipenburg & Lambregts, 2001; Burger et al., 2014). Because the region is a typical case, it can provide 
external validity. This means that the theories formed in this research are expected to be generalizable 
to other European polynuclear urban regions which come from the same historical background. These 
regions are expected to show significant similarities with the Randstad. 
The equal importance and the similarity of the four most important cities within the Randstad make 
the region polynuclear. These ‘G-4’ are surrounding the rural area of the ‘Green Heart’, making the 
actual urban region somewhat horseshoe-shaped (Lambregts, Kloosterman, Van der Werff, Roling & 
Kapoen, 2006, p.137). The urban region has never received a formal status within the Dutch 
government, but has played an important role as a planning concept within the Netherlands since the 
1950s (Lambregts et al., 2008). The Dutch government once preferred to view the Randstad as one 
world city, coining the term “decentralized metropolis” in 1958 (Ipenburg & Lambregts, 2001). Ever 
since, the on-going discussion in Dutch society on the needed institutional integration has been based 
on the idea that the Randstad should operate as one metropolis to be able to compete with other 
metropolises. However, the Dutch spatial planning agency revealed that the possibilities to create one 
Randstad metropolis are limited: “the spatial development in urban mega-regions is vastly path-
dependent. The margins within which spatial planning can take place are therefore smaller than 
politicians and spatial planners hope” (De Vries & Evers, 2007, p.14). 
In order to answer the main question of this research, data on cooperative actions between cities from 
within the Randstad should be analysed. A broad spectrum of behaviour within the urban region could 
be relevant and numerous cities and municipalities could be the basis of the research. However, focus 
will lie on the competitive or cooperative actions between the largest four cities in the Randstad. The 
behaviour of these cities towards each other is the relevant factor in this research, because they are the 
four centres that make the Randstad polynuclear. According to Burger et al. (2014), not even all of the 
G-4 cities can be considered true global cities, so extending the research further to the behaviour 
toward and among even smaller sized cities within the Randstad is irrelevant for this research.  
It is important to repeat that cooperative and competitive actions from a G-4 city toward cities outside 
of the Randstad are excluded. The Europeanization process has a specific effect on the behaviour of 
cities from the same region toward each other. On the one hand it may result in especially fierce 
competition between these cities, on the other hand cooperation within urban regions is a European 
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desire and potentially beneficial for inter-regional competition. These factors make analysis at the 
level of the urban region particularly relevant; meaning only action between G-4 cities is included.  
The research will be conducted on the behaviour of cities since 2014, because that year marks a point 
in time at which both the Randstad cities and the European Union re-evaluated and re-established their 
political priorities. Firstly, a new European ‘Multiannual Financial Framework’ (MFF) was adopted in 
2014. The MFF structures the allocation of European funds from 2014 until 2020 (Budget, European 
Commission). The framework is not the budget for the EU, but does provide information on the policy 
areas that have priority during this period. Furthermore, new coalition agreements of the municipal 
governments of the G-4 were formulated in 2014. All cities referenced their international ambitions to 
some extent in these coalition agreements (i.a. Gemeente Amsterdam, 2014
a
, pp. 12 & 30; Gemeente 
Den Haag, 2014, p. 9; Gemeente Rotterdam, 2014, p. 16; Gemeente Utrecht, 2014
a
, pp. 6-7). 
Data 
The data relevant for the research will primarily be coming from interviews held with the EU 
representatives of the G-4 municipalities who are active in the European G-4 office. Officials at this 
position have a wide overview of the international activity of their city and can provide an extensive 
insight in international activity and day-to-day practices. The interviews are semi-structured on the 
basis of a questionnaire (see appendices B and C). In this way, a broad picture can be outlined. 
Public policy statements and intentions are the second principal source of data on cooperative and 
competitive action. It was already mentioned that each of the G-4 cities has referenced their 
international intentions in their coalition agreement. Furthermore a separate document outlining 
international policy intentions is often made available by the municipal governments. In table 1, the 
available sources per municipality can be found. Unfortunately no interviews could be arranged with 
representatives of the municipalities of Amsterdam and The Hague. The municipality of Rotterdam 
has not published a specific document regarding their international policy.  
Even though 2014 marks the commence of this case study, two of the documents (the second sources 
of Amsterdam and The Hague) date from before this year. The document of The Hague is included 
because it was especially written to accompany the new funding programmes starting in 2014, so even 
though the document was published in 2013, it concerns the years 2014 and later. The Europe strategy 
of Amsterdam, originating from 2012, was also written with the multiannual programmes of the 2014-
2020 MFF in mind. The document mentions that its “objectives and actions are focussed on a program 
period of 2 years: 2012 and 2013” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2012, p.1), but the municipality of 
Amsterdam has indicated that the information in this document has not become out-dated and still 
expresses the city’s European strategy (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017).  
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Conceptual operationalization 
In order to draw conclusions regarding the influence of the European integration process on 
cooperative and competitive action in polynuclear urban regions, it is key to define and operationalize 
cooperative and competitive action. Cooperative action will be defined as: “an agreement between two 
or more G-4 cities to adjust or execute international policy regarding the European Union to 
accommodate a common goal”. Cooperation resulting from top-down Europeanization is incorporated, 
meaning non-voluntary cooperation can be included. 
Defining competition is somewhat more difficult, for the lack of cooperation does not necessarily 
point to competition. For instance, a lack of cooperation in the application process for a certain EU 
fund does not have to signify competition. It could also be that another city is not interested in the fund. 
Therefore, behaviour of competitiveness is only observed when there are no indicators of cooperative 
action and in addition an indicator of competitive or individual action is detected. Functionally, this 
means that the maintained definition of competitive action is “a city’s unwillingness to cooperate in 
favour of the pursuit of individual action”. Below, the specific indicators of cooperation and 
competition relevant to each hypothesis will be presented. Table 2 provides a schematic overview of 
these indicators. 
H1 Upload Europeanization stimulates regional cooperation because together cities are a larger weight 
in the European scale. 
It was already established that the strategy of upload Europeanization is characterized by interest 
representation at a European level. This firstly happens through lobbying offices in Brussels. The first 
indicator of cooperation for this hypothesis is therefore the establishment of joint efforts of interest 
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representation. The joint efforts will be determined in the interviewing process. A second indicator of 
cooperation could be observed in the European Eurocities network. If there is a specific G-4 
cooperation within this network too, that indicates that Europeanization particularly stimulates 
regional cooperation, even within a cooperative action consisting of cities from all over the EU.  
H2 Upload Europeanization stimulates competition because cities from polynuclear urban regions seize 
the Europeanization process as an opportunity to increase their individual international relevance. 
Upload Europeanization was hypothesised to stimulate competition because cities from polynuclear 
urban regions were thought to pursue an increased relevance through for instance city networks. To 
establish whether cities indeed seize the Europeanization process as an opportunity to increase their 
individual international relevance, the names the cities use when conducting their international policy 
will be used as indicators for competition or cooperation. Firstly to determine or eliminate cooperative 
action, the indicator for cooperation (the operation of G-4 cities under a common name) will be 
analysed. If cooperative action is not observed, and cities do pursue an individual international image, 
competition is indicated. 
H3 Download Europeanization stimulates cooperation because the European policy process is complex 
and cities cooperate to keep track of the changing policy that will impact them all. 
Two indicators of cooperation concerning this hypothesis are the establishment of joint efforts to keep 
track of the European legislative process and a habit of sharing relevant information among the G-4 
officials concerning the European legislative process. If there is no cooperation, but there are 
individual efforts to keep track of the legislative process in Brussels and potential relevant information 
for other cities is withheld, competition is indicated. Information on the practice of either sharing or 
withholding information is gathered in the interviewing process.  
H4 Download Europeanization stimulates competition because cities within the same polynuclear urban 
region will compete to obtain European funding. 
To verify whether cities compete to obtain the same European funds, it is important to first rule out 
cooperation and coordinative action among cities regarding funding applications. Cooperative action is 
firstly indicated by coordination over the division of funding. Cities could agree among each other 
which city applies for which fund. A second indicator of cooperation can be the practice of 
transparency during the application process.  
If, however, indicators of cooperative action are lacking and cities are interested in the same funds, 
indicators for competitive action become relevant. To establish whether cities are interested in and 
qualify for the same funding opportunities, there has to be evidence that there are occurrences of cities 
applying for the same European fund. The practice of applying for the same funds is the first indicator 
of competitive action. The second indicator of competitive action is the lack of transparency among 
the G-4 cities concerning on-going funding applications and applications in the past. 
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European funding is defined here in the same way as in the Pact of Amsterdam: “the provision of 
financial resources and/or instruments to finance a need, program or project” (EU Ministers 
Responsible for Urban Matters, 2016, p.6). The existing European funds available for sub-state 
authorities, are determined using the “European funds guide 2014-2020” drafted by the Association of 
Dutch Municipalities (VNG). In this guide all relevant European funds are summed up (Langhorst, 
2014) and of each of the funds it will be determined whether multiple G-4 cities have obtained grants.  
IV. Results 
In this section, results of the analysis of interviews and policy documents will be presented. It will be 
schematically shown, whether the above-mentioned indicators were observed. Furthermore, the 
acceptation or rejection of the hypotheses will be reflected upon. 
H1 The first indicator of cooperation in the context of the first hypothesis is ‘joint efforts of interest 
representation’. Interest representation is a key task of the joint G-4 office in Brussels, so it is evident 
that this indicator is observed. Even though some evidence obtained in the interviewing process 
suggested that the significance of the office is decreasing due to budget cuts and Euroscepticism in the 
Netherlands, the office can still be deemed an important tool for the G-4 cities to represent their 
interests at a European level. Even though joint efforts of interest representation were observed, the 
indicator of competition ‘individual efforts of interest representation outside of the G-4 cooperation’ is 
also observed. In the interviewing process it was noted that policy competition occurs if two or more 
cities happen to take a different position on a subject.  
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To establish whether upload Europeanization specifically stimulates regional cooperation, indicators 
concerning the Eurocities network were added. However, neither the indicator of cooperation nor the 
indicator of competition are observed. In the interview with the representative of Rotterdam, it became 
clear that city officials know each other well and will not suddenly appear with conflicting opinions in 
European networks, they will have consulted each other first. However, there are no specific meetings 
to discuss a common position purely concerning the Eurocities network. 
The hypothesis implies that Europeanization influences cooperative actions because through 
cooperation, cities put a ‘larger weight in the European scale’. This implication was confirmed. The 
cooperation in the G-4 office is a result of European integration because the European Commission 
cannot engage in conversation with all the sub-national authorities that are active in Brussels 
according to both the representatives of Utrecht and Rotterdam. The representative of the city of 
Rotterdam even literally mentioned that “cooperation puts another weight in the scale”, without 
knowing the hypothesis for this research. In the interview, a city such as Rotterdam was compared to 
Paris or London and it was acknowledged that an individual city as large as Rotterdam does not carry 
the same relevance.  
An analysis of the number of inhabitants of the cities within the Randstad compared to other cities in 
Europe confirms this view. A population of 6,211,061 lives in the combined urban regions of the G-4. 
This number is only around half as big as the number of inhabitants of the functional urban regions of 
Paris and London, where respectively 12,1 and 13,8 million people live (European Commission, 
Eurostat). The relative weight the G-4 put in the scale becomes even smaller when it is considered that 
the office is established only by the municipalities of the four cities, not including the municipalities 
surrounding them. The combined number of inhabitants within the boundaries of the G-4 municipal 
governments is only 2,4 million (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Statline). 
The fact that cities specifically seek to obtain a larger weight in the European scale means that upload 
Europeanization stimulates cooperation, which is supporting evidence for the first hypothesis. The 
established G-4 office in Brussels is the ‘home base’ of this cooperation. However, there is no 
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intention to enforce a common standpoint in this office. When there is no common standpoint, cities 
individually seek partners outside of the G-4 cooperation. This means that even though there is support 
for this hypothesis and it needs not be rejected, it is important to remain cautious. Furthermore, no 
extensive proof was found that cooperation within the urban region being specifically stimulated. 
H2 The indicators for the second hypothesis concern the names cities use when conducting their 
international and European policy. In the policy documents, no city used a name describing the 
collective of the Randstad to project their image internationally. The municipal government of The 
Hague mentions their objective to “maintain The Hague international city of peace, justice and safety” 
(Gemeente Den Haag, 2013, p.13). The municipality writes about a so-called ‘track record’ it has: a 
reputation that attracts international organisations and the economic benefits that come with it.  
The representative of Rotterdam on the other hand, stated that Rotterdam is not in need of such 
international marketing, at least not through the European Union. According to him, the city’s 
reputation is based on its actions. The Rotterdam coalition agreement confirms this statement. The city 
does not explicitly mention how it wants to present itself to the world. Only briefly is the city called “a 
city where ‘can’t be done’ does not exist” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2014, p.3), but no plans are 
described to communicate such an image internationally other than through the actions of the city. 
Amsterdam and Utrecht are a bit more like The Hague, and mention how they intend to be perceived. 
In the interview with the representative of Utrecht, the profile of “healthy urban living” was named. 
This is a profile within which the international policy of the city is shaped. The profile is pursued in 
partnership with municipalities such as Amersfoort and De Bilt, Utrecht’s direct urban neighbours, not 
with the other G-4 cities. The municipal government of Utrecht furthermore writes about being a “city 
of knowledge and culture” (Gemeente Utrecht, 2014b). It is explicitly described that the city wants to 
achieve the goal of “profiling Utrecht as a city of knowledge and culture” through the use of various 
European networks.  
Amsterdam’s municipality also mentions the use of European networks. The city calls itself an 
“international, responsible capital city” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2014b), and declares that it will 
strengthen its position as a ‘connected city’ through cooperation within networks (Gemeente 
Amsterdam, 2012). Especially Amsterdam and Utrecht seize the Europeanization process as an 
opportunity to increase their relevance, as is mentioned in the hypothesis. The cities specifically 
attribute importance to European networks and seek to utilise them to achieve the enlarged 
international relevance described by Kübler and Piliutyte (2007, p.370).  
In the interviewing process and in the policy documents, it became clear that a well-established city 
brand is seen as a helpful tool in regional competition over attracting international organisations and 
events (such as becoming the yearly ‘European Capital of Culture’) which are believed to be 
economically beneficial and to increase employment. Even though the city of Rotterdam does not  
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actively communicate a strategy to achieve a certain international image, in the interview with its 
representative it became clear that the city does concern itself with being an attractive city for 
international organisations. This evidence supports the assumption that the Europeanization process 
stimulates competition concerning cities’ international pursued name.  
However, the support only holds in the light of the economic benefits of an international image. 
During the interviews, it became clear that there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that a city image 
is pursued in order to gain political power or prestige. Individual international images of all centres of 
the polynuclear region appear to coexist without there being winners or losers in a political 
competition. In fact, the representative of Rotterdam even called the diversity of the international 
characters of the cities a strength.  
H3 Concerning this hypothesis, the two indicators for cooperation ‘joint efforts to keep track of the 
European legislative process’ and ‘sharing information on legislation that is relevant for all four cities’ 
were both observed. The two indicators for competition were not observed, which means that there is 
supporting evidence for the hypothesis.  
The establishment of the G-4 office and its objective to keep track of European regulation (G-4 Europe, 
2014) backs the first indicator of cooperation. In the interviewing process, the effective actions within 
the office and the good practice of freely sharing information became evident. The importance of the 
regional aspect of the cooperation, however, is again limited. Often, after sharing potentially relevant  
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legislation, a national platform takes over. Also, it turns out that the earlier mentioned VNG plays an 
important role in keeping cities up-to-date on European legislation. According to the interviewees, the 
G-4 cooperation is only the most important for tracking European legislation when national bodies 
such as the VNG deem certain legislation irrelevant, whereas the G-4 have another opinion.  
 H4 As mentioned above, in order to seek evidence concerning the fourth hypothesis, cooperative action 
has to be ruled out. In the interviews, it was established that there is no coordinated division of funds 
in order to prevent cities from competing over the same European funding. Furthermore, it became 
clear that no information concerning on-going applications is shared. Thus, nothing indicates 
cooperative action regarding funding application. 
Now that cooperative action has been ruled out, it has to be determined whether there are indications 
of competition. A total of 14 funds were examined based on the guide provided by the VNG. It was 
checked whether one or more G-4 cities were granted money for a project. The results of the analysis 
of granted funding can be found in appendix A. The short analysis is not even close to being a 
conclusive image of G-4 municipal funding applications, but does show that there are multiple 
occurrences of two or more G-4 cities applying for the same fund. This means that the first indicator 
of competitive action is observed.  
During the interviewing process, the second indicator was also observed. Among cities applying for a 
certain fund no willingness for transparency during an on-going application process was observed. 
Cities do not want to assist their competition by cooperatively applying. After all, a euro can only be 
spent once, and each city wants to obtain it. The observation of the second indicator of competition is 
somewhat questionable, however. It turns out that there is willingness to share information on 
successful past funding applications, but only by cities that are not involved in a funding’s follow-up 
call. Both the representatives of Rotterdam and Utrecht mentioned that in such instance, G-4 cities will 
ask each other for help and provide each other with information. This means that the hypothesis of 
competition is only supported regarding the behaviour of cities who are in the process of applying for 
the same fund.  
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V. Conclusion and discussion 
In table 7 it is made visible that there is supporting evidence for all four hypotheses. However, none of 
them can be plainly accepted, some considerations have to be taken into account. In the following 
section, conclusions regarding the hypotheses will be carefully drawn. The implications of the 
conclusions as well as the limitations of the research will also be discussed. 
Conclusions 
This research was conducted in order to answer the question: “Does European integration stimulate 
competition or does it stimulate cooperation between cities within polynuclear urban regions?” Based 
on theory, it was indicated that there are reasons to suspect competitive as well as cooperative 
behaviour among cities originating from polynuclear urban regions. The results provide supporting 
evidence to suggest that indeed the process of Europeanization sometimes leads to cooperative 
behaviour and that it is sometimes responded to with competition. 
A clear way in which Europeanization resulted in cooperation between the four main cities within the 
Randstad, is the establishment of the joint G-4 office in Brussels. The office was established in order 
to represent the cities’ interests at the higher level opened up by Europeanization. Costs associated 
with such an office are relatively high – for instance due to the fact that the office has to be legal under 
Belgian law. The G-4 reduced the costs by sharing them, which is how Europeanization led to 
cooperation. Another more indirect mechanism through which Europeanization stimulated cooperation 
comes from the fact that the process opened up internal borders, reducing the relative size of the 
Randstad cities. The cities realised that they could reach a voice as loud as European mega cities such 
as London and Paris only in cooperation. However, Europeanization also stimulated competition. The 
process opened up a larger market of international (governmental) organisations and it increased the 
opportunities for cities to acquire funding. Competition was stimulated because Europeanization 
simply increased the number of acquisitions cities could and would compete over. 
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No evidence came to light that suggests that the Europeanization process increases cooperation by a 
larger extent than it increases competition. The behaviour of cities appears to depend fully on each 
specific situation. This means that policy goals of the European Union to increase regional cooperation 
and integration are not met by the region of the Randstad in general. This brings to light another 
unexpected conclusion of the research: the results do not seem to support the assumption that the 
regional aspect of cooperation is most important even though theory suggested that it would be. There 
is no indication that the Randstad is slowly integrating into one urban mega region because of 
Europeanization, nor is there anything suggesting that the four cities are willing to give up their 
independence in order to increase the revenue of their urban region. It is true that the G-4 cooperate 
with each other in Europe and that they are from the same region, but if they cannot agree, they seek 
partners outside of the Randstad. Furthermore, it turns out that often – for instance concerning the 
process of keeping up with European legislation – national cooperative associations (such as the VNG) 
appear to be more important.  
The most important pattern uncovered here therefore seems to be that cities’ reaction to the 
Europeanization process depends on each specific situation. Cooperation is stimulated, but happens 
only when the cities’ objectives are in line with one another. When they are not, there is competition. 
For each hypothesis it held that in general an aspect of Europeanization stimulated either cooperation 
or competition, but did not necessarily do so in all cases. For instance, the increased availability of 
funds cities can acquire, stimulates competition over them. However, not all cities are always 
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participating in this competition. When a city is not competing, it is willing to cooperate and share 
information. Same goes for interest representation: because of the larger European scale, interests are 
attempted to be represented in cooperation to reduce costs and gain a seat at the Commission’s table. 
However, when cities cannot agree, they will engage in policy competition and seek partners 
elsewhere.  
Discussion 
The results of this research appear to indicate that the European Union’s goals of increasing regional 
integration have not been achieved when taking the entire region of the Randstad in consideration. 
Cooperation is stimulated when interests overlap – which they often do – but it appears to happen for 
the good of each independent city not with the benefit of an integrated Randstad in mind. If policy 
makers consider the current shape of cooperation not extensive enough, they could suggest a more top-
down approach to enforce cooperation to achieve integration within the region. On the other hand, 
spatial planners could also consider leaving the idea of the Randstad as one integrated urban mega 
region behind. 
During the research, some evidence came up that suggested the Randstad to be an urban region only in 
the minds of people. The centre cities are “roughly in commuting distance” as is needed for the urban 
region to qualify as polynuclear (Ipenburg & Lambregts, 2001), but according to the interviewees, the 
functional commuting lines do not lie between all four cities. The most important regionally-based 
cooperation named by the representative of Utrecht, is the cooperation with its urban neighbours. For 
Rotterdam, the “Metropoolregio Rotterdam Den Haag” (Metropolis-region Rotterdam The Hague, 
MRDH) was considered to be the most relevant urban region. The MRDH is a cooperative action of 
23 municipalities focussed on projects concerning mobility and infrastructure in order to increase the 
region’s strategic accessibility and strengthen the economic business climate (MRDH, 2017). The 
interviewed representative of Rotterdam did not observe such an extensive connectedness between the 
southern two cities and Utrecht or Amsterdam. This suggests that the Randstad region does not consist 
of one polynuclear urban mega region, but of at least three urban regions that should be approached 
independently: the MRDH, the urban  region of Utrecht and the urban region surrounding Amsterdam. 
In other words: the functionally interrelatedness mentioned in the definition of Burger et al. (2014) 
appears to be lower than expected. 
The research design for this study involved an exemplifying case study in order to uncover 
mechanisms about which not much theory has been formed. It turns out that the mechanism uncovered 
(that the urban response to Europeanization depends mainly on the specific situation) had indeed not 
yet extensively come to light in the theoretical section. It turns out that among the G-4 cities, there is a 
culture of first seeking cooperation, but if establishing cooperation is not possible, there is competition. 
In the Randstad, social capital in the form of mutual trust and norms of reciprocity appear to be high. 
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This makes the establishment of cooperation easy, because it lowers transaction costs associated with 
cooperation. Even though the G-4 cities first try to cooperate, the cities agree and understand that they 
cannot always be in the same camp and deal with this in a flexible manner. Another city’s successes 
are not begrudged and political competition over status and power has not been observed. 
The well-established practice of first trying to cooperate is possibly the result of the proximity of the 
four cities. As Saxenian (1996) theorised, geographic proximity helps to engage in sustained 
collaboration. Nevertheless, the functional urban region may not encompass the entire region of the 
Randstad. It was show that the functional interdependency of the Randstad may not be large enough 
for the region to be analysed as a whole even though the case was initially deemed a typical case of 
polynuclearity. The fact that the true functional urban region around the G-4 cities may be smaller than 
the entire region of the Randstad, means that the research has limited external validity. The internal 
connectedness is possibly too low to truly call the Randstad a polynuclear urban region, which means 
that the results cannot be generalised to other (polynuclear) urban regions.  
Not only the situation within the Randstad might not have been subject to large enough scrutiny, the 
political situation within each city may have also been insufficiently considered. During the 
interviewing process, it became clear that policy makers and lobbyists can deem cooperation most 
efficient at times, but cannot operate without backup from the politicians. Politicians are often 
preoccupied with their re-election and their electorate is in their own city, not in the urban region. If 
the electorate is Eurosceptic, the extent to which politicians strive for European cooperation could 
decrease considerably. Furthermore, differences in political colour between politicians of each city, 
could potentially have a constraining impact on opportunities to cooperate because it creates 
difficulties for cities to reach a common position. 
This research only suffices as an initial insight in the effects of Europeanization on polynuclear urban 
regions. Aspects of local politics have not been incorporated in the research, and the complexities 
regarding the interconnectedness of the Randstad have not been uncovered. Furthermore, only a 
limited number of city representatives could be interviewed and only a small number of policy 
documents was reviewed. In order to fully uncover behavioural patterns, the current research should 
be extended. Issues with the interconnectedness in the Randstad could be incorporated, as well as the 
local political situation in each of the G-4 cities. Furthermore, a comparative analysis between 
multiple polynuclear urban regions could uncover whether the high level of social capital is possibly 
unique to the Randstad and whether Europeanization has the same effect in all polynuclear regions.  
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Appendix A: G-4 European funding 
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Notes on appendix A 
1
 A grant was only counted when it was given directly to the municipal government, not for instance 
when it was granted to a partner or joint venture of a municipality. However, it could be that a 
municipal government is not mentioned by the fund, but was involved in the application for the grant 
in a partnership. Unfortunately, funds only provide easily accessible online information concerning 
active projects and not concerning projects of the past. In addition, there is no information on 
applications that did not result in a grant. The method used is vastly inconclusive, but it is extensive 
enough to demonstrate that it does occur that cities apply for the same European funds. 
2
 The funds list was drafted based on the VNG’s funds guide. Some funds were eliminated, especially 
programmes directly under responsibility of the European Commission with changing conditions for 
each call. This happened because there were difficulties to find out how the funds were spent in the 
short time period during which this research was conducted.  
3
 Projects were counted on the website of the Dutch organisation responsible for allocating the Dutch 
Western Region’s ERDF funds: “Kansen voor West” (chances for west).  
Source: http://www.kansenvoorwest2.nl/nl/projecten/ 
4
 Projects retrieved from the website of agentschap SZW (Dutch social affairs and employment agency) 
Source: https://www.agentschapszw.nl/documenten/publicaties/2016/archief/overzichten-verleende-
subsidies/actie-a-2014-2020-xls 
5
 Projects were counted on the website of the Dutch bureau responsible for allocating these European 
funds. Source: https://regiebureau-pop.eu/ 
6
 Projects were counted on the website of the Netherlands Enterprise Agency, which allocated the 
European funds. Source: http://www.rvo.nl/onderwerpen/agrarisch-ondernemen/visserij/eu-fonds-
voor-maritieme-zaken-en-visserij 
7
 Source: http://www.interreg2seas.eu/en/summary/projects 
8
 Source: http://projects.northsearegion.eu/vb/overview/search/&country=58# 
9
 Source: http://www.nweurope.eu/projects/beneficiaries-search/ 
10
 Source: https://www.interregeurope.eu/discover-projects/ 
11
 Source: http://urbact.eu/sites/default/files/urbact_list_of_approved_operation_june_2016.pdf 
12
 Source: https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/cordisH2020projects 
13
 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/project/Projects/index.cfm?fuseaction=home. 
search&cfid=3357114&cftoken=96169418 
14
 For this fund, only the allocation of the funds for the years 2016 and 2017 could be retrieved. 
Sources: http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/2017_annexe_awp_en.pdf  and 
http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/2016_annexe_awp_en.pdf  
15 
The allocation of the Erasmus Plus and Erasmus Plus Sport funding can both be found via the same 
website. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/  
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Appendix B: Questionnaire English 
Questionnaire: The effect of European integration on the behaviour of cities in polynuclear 
regions. 
General questions 
- Does the city pursue an active European policy in which there is no direct cooperation or 
coordination with the Dutch government? 
- What is the difference in the cooperation of [city] with the other G-4 cities and other cities in 
the Randstad? 
- What is the difference in the cooperation of [city] with the other G-4 cities and other Dutch or 
non-Dutch European cities outside of the Randstad? 
H1 Upload Europeanization leads to regional cooperation because together cities are a larger weight in the 
European scale. 
- How important is the European G-4 office in representing urban interests in Brussels? 
o Is the office more or less important that other means of interest representation? 
(Where in the ranking is the G-4 cooperation positioned?) 
- Does it happen that the representative of [city]  within the office is constrained in the 
cooperation with the other representatives because the municipal government is pursuing a 
specific individual interest?  
o A constrain could be: withholding information, not participating in certain projects 
- Is there lobbying with other European or Dutch cities outside of the Randstad? 
- In which way does [city] use the opportunities provided by the Eurocities network? 
o Within the network, is there cooperation or a special consultation specifically with the 
other G-4 cities? 
o Within the network, is there cooperation or a special consultation with other cities 
within the Randstad? 
o Within the network, is there cooperation or a special consultation with similar 
European cities outside of the Randstad? 
H2 Upload Europeanization leads to competition because cities from polynuclear urban regions seize the 
Europeanization process as an opportunity to increase their individual international relevance. 
- To was extent is the membership of European networks such as Eurocities meant to shape the 
image of [city] towards other G-4 cities, other (European) cities or the national government? 
- Do you perceive competition between the G-4 cities for power or reputation with respect to 
the international image of the cities? 
- Is the emphasis on the image of [city] or the Randstad region (or another cooperative network) 
in the European context? 
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H3 Download Europeanization leads to cooperation because the European policy process is complex and 
cities cooperate to keep track of the changing policy that will impact them all. 
- How important is the European G-4 office to keep up with European regulations that are 
relevant to [city]? 
o Is the office more or less important than other means to acquire information? (Where 
in the ranking is the G-4 cooperation positioned?) 
- Will information that is relevant to all G-4 cities be shared if one of the cities learns about it 
before the others?  
H4 Download Europeanization leads to competition because cities within the same polynuclear urban 
region will compete to obtain European funding. 
- Is there some action towards the other G-4 cities with respect to an application for a European 
fund? 
o Exchanging information with respect to the process to apply 
o Offering of help with the application 
o Seeking help with the application 
- Is there a difference in the exchange of information with smaller cities in the Randstad and the 
G-4 cities? 
- Is there an active cooperation or exchange of information concerning European funding 
applications between [city] and another Dutch or European city outside of the Randstad? 
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Appendix  C: Questionnaire Dutch 
Vragenlijst: Het effect van Europese integratie op het gedrag van steden in polynucleaire regio’s. 
Algemene vragen 
- Streeft de stad een actief Europees beleid na waarbij geen sprake is van directe samenwerking 
met of coördinatie door de Nederlandse overheid ? 
- Wat is het verschil in de samenwerking van [stad] met de overige grote vier steden en andere 
steden in de Randstad? 
- Wat is het verschil in de samenwerking van [stad] met de overige grote vier steden en andere 
Nederlandse of Europese steden buiten de Randstad? 
H1 Upload Europeanization leads to regional cooperation because together cities are a larger weight in the 
European scale. 
- Hoe belangrijk is het Europese G-4 kantoor in het vertegenwoordigen van de stedelijke 
belangen in Brussel? 
o Is het kantoor belangrijker of minder belangrijk dan andere manieren of netwerken om 
aan informatie te komen? (Waar in de ranglijst staat de samenwerking met de G-4?) 
- Wordt de vertegenwoordiger binnen het kantoor van [stad] wel eens beperkt in de 
samenwerking met de overige vertegenwoordigers omdat van uit de gemeente een specifiek 
een eigen belang nagestreefd wordt?  
o Beperkt in de samenwerking kan zijn dat informatie achtergehouden wordt, of 
bepaalde projecten niet aangegrepen worden. 
- Wordt er samen met andere Europese of Nederlandse steden buiten de Randstad gelobbyd? 
- Op welke wijze benut [stad] de mogelijkheden binnen het Eurocities netwerk? 
o Is er binnen het netwerk sprake van samenwerking of speciaal overleg specifiek met 
andere G-4 gemeentes? 
o Is er binnen het netwerk sprake van samenwerking of speciaal overleg met andere 
steden binnen de Randstad? 
o Is er binnen het netwerk sprake van samenwerking of speciaal overleg met 
vergelijkbare Europese steden buiten de Randstad? 
H2 Upload Europeanization leads to competition because cities from polynuclear urban regions seize the 
Europeanization process as an opportunity to increase their individual international relevance. 
- In hoeverre is het lidmaatschap van Europese netwerken als Eurocities bedoeld om de stad 
richting de G-4 gemeentes, andere (Europese) steden of de nationale staat te profileren? 
- Neemt u een machts- of reputatiestrijd waar tussen de grote vier gemeentes met betrekking tot 
de internationale profilering van de steden? 
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- Wordt in Europees verband de nadruk gelegd op de profilering van [stad] of op de profilering 
van de Randstad-regio (of een ander samenwerkingsverband) in het algemeen? 
H3 Download Europeanization leads to cooperation because the European policy process is complex and 
cities cooperate to keep track of the changing policy that will impact them all. 
- Hoe belangrijk is het Europese G-4 kantoor om bij te houden welke Europese regelingen van 
toepassing zijn op [stad]? 
o Is het kantoor belangrijker of minder belangrijk dan andere manieren of netwerken om 
aan informatie te komen? (Waar in de ranglijst staat de samenwerking met de G-4?) 
- Wordt informatie die relevant is voor alle G-4 steden gedeeld als één gemeente er eerder van 
op de hoogte is? 
H4 Download Europeanization leads to competition because cities within the same polynuclear urban 
region will compete to obtain European funding. 
- Wordt er actie ondernomen richting de overige G-4 gemeentes met betrekking tot Europese 
fondsaanvraag? 
o Informatie-uitwisseling m.b.t. het aanvraagproces 
o Hulp bieden bij fondsaanvraag 
o Raad vragen bij fondsaanvraag 
- Is er een verschil in informatie-uitwisseling tussen kleinere steden in de Randstad en de grote 
vier steden?  
- Is er actieve samenwerking of informatie-uitwisseling tussen uw gemeente en andere 
Nederlandse of Europese gemeentes buiten de Randstad als het gaat om fondsaanvraag? 
 
 
 
